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Managing Development in a Time of Crisis:
The Legal Framework for the Temporary Relocation
of the African Development Bank*
ADESEGuN A. AxIN-OLUGBADE*

I. Introduction
In the law, the definition of a person includes both natural (physical) and legal persons.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "person" as: "(1) a human being; (2) an entity (such as a
corporation) that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a human being;
(3) the living body of a human being."' An international organization falls within the second
category of persons, because the constitutive instruments of most international organizations provide that they shall possess full juridical personality.' Indeed, the recognition of
international organizations as possessing legal personality has evolved since the time of
Hugo Grotius and today has become one of the foundational principles of the contemporary
law of nations.' According to Ian Brownlie, the criteria of legal personality in organizations
may be summarized as follows:
*Adesegun Akin-Olugbade is General Counsel of the African Development Bank Group (African Development Bank, African Development Fund and the Nigeria Trust Fund). In October 2002, he was appointed
interim Chairperson of the Board of Governors of the African Law Institute. SJD and LL.M., Harvard Law
School; LL.B. (Honours), King's College London (University of London); and LL.M. (International Financial
Law), King's College. He is a member of the International Bar Association, and was a Rockefeller Scholar.
Allow me to express my appreciation and profound gratitude to Joe Norton, Heba Shams, and Iwa Ainrinsola for inviting me to share my thoughts with you within the framework of these distinguished lecture series
dedicated to the legacy of one of the foremost development lawyers of the twentieth century, the late Dr.
Ibrahim F.I.Shihata, former Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank. Shihata, a fellow
Harvard Law School alumnus, was not only a creative and original jurist, he was a dedicated and selfless
international official whose works have made a major impact in the field of international economic and financial
law. I am also honoured to be included among the distinguished scholars and international officials who have
preceded me in participating in these Distinguished Lecture Series.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999).
2. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003); Agreement Establishing the

African Development Bank, Aug. 4, 1963, art. 51, 510 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ADB Agreement]; and Agreement Establishing the African Development Fund, Nov. 29, 1972, art. 42, 28 U.SJ. 4547 [hereinafter ADF
Agreement].
A HANDBOOK ON IN3. NGUYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 567-634 (2d ed.). Cf.,
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/MANuEL SUR LES ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONALES (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed. 1988).
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(1) a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs;
(2) distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its
members; and
(3) existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely within
4
the national systems of one or more states.
In our troubled and divided world, international organizations at times have to operate
under increasingly challenging conditions. While it is true that most international institutions enjoy privileged status in their host states in line with accepted norms of international
law, occasions can and do arise when civil conflicts or the breakdown of law and order
would seriously jeopardize the normal conduct of operations.5 Although it is not uncommon
to read or hear about natural persons fleeing from, or escaping conflict zones to seek refuge
in third countries, it is rare and most unusual for international organizations to leave their
headquarters in order to escape from conflict or crises. When a situation arises where such
a drastic decision has to be made, legal issues arise that have to be addressed. These include
such questions as: What legal provisions will govern the process of temporary relocation?
Which organs of the institution are empowered to authorize such a move? What are the
implications for the rights and privileges of the institution's personnel and principal officers? What legal engineering is needed to reconcile the question of conflicting interests
and to ensure the business continuity of the entity?
The topic for the Tenth Distinguished Shihata Lecture is the African Development
Bank's (the Bank) experience in transferring operations from its headquarters in Abidjan,
Cote d'Ivoire, in West Africa, to its Temporary Relocation Agency (TRA) in the city of
Tunis, Tunisia, in North Africa.
The presentation will be in five parts. Part II will examine the temporary relocation
decision in its proper historical context. Part III will present the legal framework for the
temporary relocation decision and will oudine and explain the specific legal issues addressed
in designing the legal framework. Part IV discusses certain critical legal issues that were
raised and addressed in the aftermath of the temporary relocation or transfer of operations
to the TRA in Tunis in February 2003. In particular, the legal arrangements established to
protect the interests of affected staff members of the institution will be examined. Part V
reviews the few cases of other institutions that have had to relocate their operations in similar
circumstances; notably, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) during the Second World
War in Europe (1939-1945), the Kuwaiti Fund, the PTA Bank in Eastern and Southern
Africa and the African Regional Office of the World Health Organization (AFRO). Finally
in Part VI, entitled "Epilogue," insights about the lessons to be learned will be outlined.
II. The Bank's Temporary Relocation Decision:
The Historical Context
The Bank will celebrate its fortieth anniversary on September 10, 2004. The Bank is the
second oldest of the regional multilateral development banks (MDBs), after the Inter-

4. Article 51 of the ADB Agreement provides that: "In the territory of each member, the Bank shall possess
full juridical personality and, in particular, full capacity to: (a)Contract; (b) acquire and dispose of immovable
and movable property; and (c) institute legal proceedings." ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 51.
5. A. S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES: ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGALRELATIONSHIP (1995).
VOL. 38, NO. 3
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American Development Bank, which together with the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and IMF, make up the
major part of the complex edifice of international development financial institutions. On
August 4, 1963, the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank (ADB Agreement) was signed in Khartoum, Sudan, by twenty-three African governments and became
effective on September 10, 1964, when twenty member countries subscribed 65 percent of
the initial authorized capital stock. The Bank was initially established as an international
institution owned exclusively by African nations. 6 The Bank's purpose is to contribute to
the sustainable economic development and social progress of its regional (African) members, both individually and jointly.7 The functions of the Bank are set forth in article 2 of
the ADB Agreement. Article 2(3) of the ADB Agreement provides that "the Bank shall be
guided in all its decisions by the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of this Agreement,"-that is
by its Purpose and Functions.' In line with its founding mandate, the Bank has operations
spanning the length and breadth of the continent of Africa, with projects in infrastructures,
rural and agricultural development, education, health and social development. Over the
years, it has evolved to become the leading developmental financial institution in Africa,
with an authorized capital in excess of US$30 billion and cumulative disbursements of more
than US$50 billion (equivalent to UA 33.22 billion) since its establishment.
In terms of its organizational structure, article 5 of the ADB Agreement provides that
the Bank shall have a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, a President, at least one
Vice President and other officers and staff necessary to perform such duties as the Bank
may determine. The founders of the Bank, recognizing the importance of establishing the
institution at a location within its geographical sphere of operations, provided in article 39
of the ADB Agreement that the principal office of the Bank should be located in the territory
of a regional (African) member state.9 The Board of Governors will make the choice of the
location of the principal office at its first meeting, taking into account the availability of
facilities for the proper functioning of the Bank. The ADB Agreement also provides that
the Bank may establish branch offices and agencies elsewhere. As set forth in detail later, a
number of the decisions would turn on the interpretation and application of these provisions. As with the other multilateral development banks, questions of interpretation of the
ADB Agreement's provisions are within the purview of the powers of the Bank's Board of
Directors. Such interpretations may be formal or informal, explicit or implicit, and are
usually made on the basis of the General Counsel's advice. Recourse against interpretative
decisions by the Board of Directors may be taken to the Board of Governors, whose decision
must be sought within a specified time period (three months), and that decision shall be
final. 10 According to Shihata: "The overall purpose of an international organization and the
actual challenges and needs to which . .. it is required to respond, are in practice determinant factors in interpreting its charter.""

6.

THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

BANK 1964-84:
(Robert K.A.

ARInJAN, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

AN EXPERIMENT IN COOPERATION AND
Gardiner & James Pickett eds., 1984).

DEVELOPMENT,

7. ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.
8. Id. art. 61.
9. Id. art. 39.
10. Id. art. 61.
11.

IBRAHIM

F. I.

SHIHATA,

THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS (2000) [hereinafter SHIHATA].
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In November 1964, the Bank's Board of Governors decided at its first annual meeting
that the Bank's headquarters would be in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. 1 This decision was made
on a one-member-one-vote basis, not in accordance with the normal voting rules of the
institution. Article 39(2) of the ADB Agreement provides that decisions on "the choice of
the location of the principal office of the Bank shall be made ...in accordance with the
conditions that applied to the adoption of [the ADB Agreement]." 3 In effect, the decision
on the choice of location is a difficult one, and likely to be influenced by political considerations. Transferring the headquarters is, therefore, not a first option to be considered in
a crisis situation. An agreement dated March 16, 1968, was signed between the Bank and
the Government of Cote d'Ivoire and was ratified by the Board of Governors in 1968.14
Another important milestone event in the Bank's history was the establishment, in 1973,
of the concessional window of the Bank Group, the African Development Fund (the Fund),
which is an international financial institution, formed as a partnership between the Bank
and mainly non-African donor countries. The objective of the Fund is to enable the Bank
to make "an increasingly effective contribution to the economic and social development of
the Bank's members and to the promotion of co-operation (including regional and subregional co-operation) and increased international trade, particularly among such members."' 5 In 1976, the Bank agreed to administer the Nigeria Trust Fund as the third lending
window of the Bank Group. The Nigeria Trust Fund was established with the resources
provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with the objective of
promoting the development of lesser-developed African Countries. Although the African
Development Fund is a separate international legal entity, it expressly provides in its Charter
that: "the Office of the Fund shall be the principal office of the Bank." 6 The Nigeria Trust
Fund is a Special Fund 7 of the Bank, and accordingly, in legal terms, forms an integral part
of the Bank. A decision to relocate the operations of the Bank would therefore, mutatis
mutandis, necessitate a relocation of the operations of these other entities of the Bank
Group.'
In 1982, non-African countries were admitted into membership of the Bank, following
a historic decision by the Bank in 1979 to open up its capital to non-African states. 9 With
the implementation of the recent internal governance reforms,l ° 60 percent of the author12. Resolution No. 4-64 on the location of the Principal Office of the Bank adopted at the First Annual
Meeting held in Lagos, Nigeria in November 1964.
13. ADB Agreement, supra
note 2, art. 39(2).
14. Resolution No. 1-68 on the Headquarters Agreements adopted by correspondence on May 15, 1968.
Under international law, an international organization can conclude an international agreement with a State.
Such agreements are treaties: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations signed on March 21, 1986.
15. ADF Agreement, supra
note 2, art. 2. South Africa became the first African member or state participant
of the ADF in 1998, although other African countries, notably Botswana had contributed earlier to replenishments of the ADF.
16. Id. art. 32.
17. ADB Agreement, supra
note 2, art.8.
18. Although, the decision-making organs of the Bank made many of the principal decisions, these were
considered binding on the Fund. The Boards of Directors of the Bank and the Fund made certain decisions
jointly.
19. Resolution 2-78 (in particular the Annex to the Resolution which established the "African Character
Principles" as the basis for the admission of non-African States and Resolution 05-79 on the Amendments of
the ADB Agreement to enable non-African countries become members of the Bank.
20.

REPORT OF THE EMINENT PERSONS PANEL ON GOVERNANCE OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

VOL. 38, NO. 3

(1996).
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ized capital of the Bank is held by its African members and 40 percent by non-African
members. 2 The Bank is rated AAA by all the leading international ratings agencies,2 2 and
actively participates as a borrower in the international capital markets.
In 1999, with heightened concerns about the security situation in its host country, the
Bank decided to adopt a Business Continuity and Emergency Plan (Plan).2" This Plan,
which is modelled on the United Nations Emergency Plan, establishes a formal system of
security alert phases to respond to crises situations at the Bank's headquarters. It also provides for the establishment of a temporary relocation agency in a regional member country
of the Bank. The legal basis for the establishment of the temporary relocation agency can
be found in article 39(3) of the ADB Agreement and article 4 of the General Regulations
4
of the Bank. Although article 39(3) refers to "the Bank" (but does not specify which of
the principal organs of the Bank should make the relevant decision), the Board of Directors,
following the General Counsel's advice, informally interpreted the provisions of article
39(3) as empowering the Board to establish agencies as an adjunct of its specific power to
conduct the general operations of the Bank, in the same manner that the Board is empowered to authorize the establishment of field offices of the Bank. In 2002, the Board of
Directors of the Bank and the Fund met and jointly selected Tunis as the site for the Bank's
first TRA.2 s An agreement was subsequently signed between the Bank, the Fund, and the
Government of Tunisia on the establishment of the TRA. This agreement is a hybrid
international agreement or treaty, incorporating the standard provisions contained in the
Bank's regional and national field office agreements, but also contains certain privileges,
26
immunities and facilities that are usually set forth in a fully fledged Headquarters Agreement.

Ill. Temporary Relocation Decision: Legal Framework
Following the abortive coup d'etat in the host country of its headquarters on September
19, 2002, and with the steady deterioration in the security situation of the host country,
which had begun to adversely impact the Bank Group's activities, the Boards of Directors
of the Bank and the Fund decided to declare a Security Alert Phase III, and thereby approve
the voluntary relocation of dependants2 7 of staff members from the host country.2s Staff

21. The Bank currently has seventy-seven members (fifty-three African countries and twenty-four nonAfrican countries). The non-African countries include the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy,
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Brazil, Korea, China, India, Nordic Countries, and Switzerland. Nigeria is currently the largest shareholder followed by the United States, Japan, Egypt, Germany,
and South Africa.
22. Standard & Poor's, Fitch, Moody's, and Japan Rating Agency.
23. The African Development Bank Group's Integrated Strategy for the Continuation of the Bank's Activities and Security of its Staff in an Emergency Situation (Document ADB/BD/WP/2001/03-ADF/BD/WP/
2001/01).
24. SeeOpinion of the General Counsel dated September 8, 2000 on the Devolution of Authority in an
Emergency Situation.
25. Resolution B/BD/2002/-F/BD/2002/. The Executive Director of the host country opposed the decision
and requested that a formal statement by the Government of the host country be attached to the Official
Records of the Boards proceedings (Summary of Decisions).
26. TRA Agreement dated April 17, 2002.
27. The concept of a dependant is common to international organizations and refers in general terms to
nuclear family members or close relatives considered eligible for certain financial benefits provided by such
institutions or organizations to their staff members. Typical dependants would be the staff member's spouse
and children (up to a maximum number that is determined by the organization and specified in its Staff Rules).
28. Resolution B/BD/2002/23-F/BD/2002/24.
FALL 2004
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members could, at their discretion and within a specified period, opt to have their dependants evacuated from the host country at the Bank's expense. The Bank was empowered to
pay monthly stipends to evacuated dependants to ease the financial burden on the staff of
maintaining two households after the voluntary evacuation. A significant aspect of this
Board of Directors' decision was the extension of the evacuation option to dependants of
general services staff who are non-nationals of the host country. In accordance with applicable international civil service laws and the Bank's Staff Rules and Regulations (the internal
law of the Bank), general services staff are recruited on local terms (i.e., exclusively among
nationals of member countries lawfully resident within the territory of the host country)
and, unlike internationally recruited staff, are generally not entitled to expatriate benefits,
including the right to be evacuated by the international organization. However, an exception was made for dependants of non-nationals to be evacuated at the staff member's discretion, on compassionate grounds, thus setting a precedent for other international organizations in similar situations in the future.
As the crisis in the host country unfolded, with considerable anxiety and concerns about
the possible adverse impact on the Bank's business and the security of its staff, certain
Executive Directors wanted the Bank to make an expeditious decision and sought the advice
of the General Counsel on the appropriate and legally feasible options available to the
Bank. Against the backdrop of the provisions of the Bank's Charter prohibiting interference
by the Bank in the political affairs of its member countries, 29, and inspired by the fundamental principle that "the client of the Bank's General Counsel is not only the Bank's
Management, the Boards, or any particular member country, but the institution as whole,
including all its organs,"3 0 the advice had to carefully balance the many competing interests,
in order to avoid any breach of the Bank's obligations under the Headquarters Agreement
with the host country. The overarching considerations were, however, adherence to the
rule of law and safeguarding the Bank's interest, i.e. ensuring its survival as a viable entity
to enable it to continue to deliver on its development mandate.
The process of reaching a decision on the temporary relocation was as important as the
substantive decisions that were eventually made. In 1998, an entity that would play a significant role in the decision-making process had been established,3" as a forum for member
states to dialogue on issues pertaining to the Bank, and development in Africa, generally,
in order to increase the Board of Governors oversight functions. 2 The Governors Consultative Committee (GCC) is a subsidiary organ" of the Board of Governors and comprises
Governors or Alternate Governors of the member states whose nationals are members of
the Board of Directors.3 4 In effect, the GCC is composed of eighteen Governors (the same
number as Executive Directors) and membership rotates with the rotation of membership
of the Board of Directors. Given that most of the principal shareholders of the institution
are represented on the GCC, its deliberations are weighty and its recommendations
(reached by consensus in all cases) are very persuasive, if not compelling.

29. ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 38.

supra note 11.

30.

SHIHATA,

31.
32.
33.
34.

By Resolution B/BG/98/06 adopted on May 29, 1998.
Section 1 (Purpose) of the Terms of Reference (FOR) of the Governors Consultative Committee (GCC).
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors of the Bank.
Section 2 (Composition) of the TOR of the GCC.
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The GCC may be convened by its Chairperson, in consultation with members, by the
Board of Directors, by Governors having one-quarter of the total voting power of the Board
of Governors, or whenever requested by five members of the GCC 55 Such a request was
made and a meeting of the GCC was convened on December 17, 2002 in Accra, Ghana.
The GCC, after reviewing the proposals before it, and considering the various options
submitted for its consideration, agreed to defer making any recommendations on the proposal to activate the TRA until another meeting, scheduled for February 17-18, 2003. The
Communiqu6 issued by the GCC at the end of its deliberations was unusually detailed, and
the operative paragraph 8 stated as follows:
Recognizing the on-going political efforts by regional Heads of State and France towards
reaching settlement of the present crisis in the host country, the GCC agreed that at its meeting
on 17-18 February 2003 in Accra, Ghana, it would review developments in the host3 country
6
and provide guidance to the Board of Directors on the implementation of the TRA.
The concluding part of the paragraph touched upon a substantive legal issue pertaining to
the mandate of the GCC and the scope of its recommendations. It had been argued that
as a subsidiary organ of the Board of Governors, the GCC could only make recommendations to the Board of Governors. The GCC had no authority to give directives to any
other decision-making organ of the Bank (notably, the Board of Directors or the President)
without transmitting such recommendations or directives through the Board of Governors.
The General Counsel, Adesegun A. Akin-Olugbade considered this view to be rather restrictive and impractical. The GCC had a very broad mandate and in the discharge of its
responsibilities could deliberate on matters that were within the purview of the other
decision-making organs. It was imperative that its recommendations could be acted upon
without necessarily first transmitting them through the Board of Governors, which meets
formally only once a year, although extraordinary meetings could be convened. These meetings are, however, rare and only two have been convened in the nearly forty-year existence
of the Bank." In an opinion issued on the subject by the General Counsel, he stated that
the recommendations and views of the GCC may contain advice that could serve as guidance to either Management or the Board of Directors; particularly on matters that are
within the purview of the powers of these decision making organs of the Bank." He concluded that there had been a recent precedent for the GCC providing guidance on matters
within its mandate to the Board of Directors and the President. Therefore, it was possible
that the GCC could provide guidance to the Board of Directors on the activation of the
TRA, even though the matter was within the purview of the Board of Directors' powers.
The Board of Governors, as the highest policy making organ of the Bank could review the
decision of the Board of Directors if it so wishes.39

35. Id. § 3 (Meetings of the GCC).
36. Communique of the Governors' Consultative Committee of the African Development Bank, para. 8 (Dec. 17,
2002) [hereinafter GCC Communique].
37. In 1979, to consider and resolve the crises triggered by the suspension of the then President of the Bank,
and in 2000 when the regular meeting was cancelled. A. Alin-Olugbade: Legal Note on Convening an Extraordinary Meeting of the Board of Governors of the African Development Bank, Sept. 12, 2002.
38. Advisory Legal Opinion dated Dec. 11, 2002, addressed to the Executive Director representing the host
country.
39. Article 5 of the General Regulations allows the Board of Directors to adopt rules and regulations as are
necessary or appropriate for the conduct of the general operations of the Bank. Any such rules or regulations
and any amendments thereto shall be subject to review by the Board of Governors at the next Annual Meeting.

FALL 2004
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A corollary conclusion of the December GCC Meeting, which proved to be prescient,
was the statement that:
the full Emergency Plan of the Bank would be activated should the UN declare Phase IV in
Abidjan or if the working environment makes it impossible for the Bank to carry out its activities, in which case the President and the Board have full powers under the Emergency Plan
to take the necessary measures °
The next sentence was even more revealing with the benefit of hindsight: "The GCC
welcomed the statement of the Governor of the host country expressing his Government's
4
full support in that eventuality." '
On the eve of the next GCC meeting which would provide final guidance to the Board
of Directors on the relocation of the Bank's operations to its TRA in Tunis, the United
Nations declared Phase IV in Abidjan. A meeting of the Board of Directors was convened
on February 7, 2003, and the Bank's Emergency Plan was activated.42 In accordance with
the Emergency Plan, the Bank sent approximately 400 staff members to Paris (the location
of the Bank's Business Continuity Site) and Tunis to ensure business continuity and the
maintenance of the essential functions of the Bank.43 The GCC meeting's conclusions were
not surprising. The GCC recommended that the Bank should temporarily relocate its
operations to its TRA and take as many staff as necessary to enable it to resume, as soon
as possible, its operations in its regional member countries and to provide support to regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). "The
GCC stressed the importance of the Bank reconstituting itself in a short time to enable it
[to] deliver on its development mandate."- 4 It was also stated that, "in this regard, the GCC
was guided by the advice given by the General Counsel that such action was within the
purview of the Board of Directors and that the assignment of staff to any duty station was
4
within the powers of the President of the Bank.

IV. Legal Issues Raised in the Aftermath of the Temporary
Relocation
A brief outline of the legal basis of the General Counsel's advice, which provided guidance
to the GCC in making its historic recommendation, follows. Article 29(1) of the ADB
Agreement provides that "[a]ll the powers of the Bank shall be vested in the Board of
Governors." 46 It also provides that the Board of Governors may delegate its powers to the
Board of Directors except certain specific powers that are enumerated in sub-paragraphs
(a)-(h) of article 29(2). 47 Article 32 of the ADB Agreement provides that:
[w]ithout prejudice to the powers of the Board of Governors as provided in article 29, the
Board of Directors shall be responsible for the conduct of the general operations of the Bank

40. GCC Communique, supra note 36, para. 9.
41. Id.
42. Resolution B/BD/2003/02-F/BD/2003/O1 adopted on Feb. 7, 2003, authorizing the implementation of
the Bank's integrated Strategy for the Continuation of the Bank's Activities and Security of its Staff in an
Emergency Situation.
43. Paragraph 3 of the GCC Communique, Feb. 18, 2003.
44. Id. para. 8.
45. Id.
46. ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29(1).
47. Id. art. 29(2).
VOL. 38, NO. 3
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and for this purpose shall, in addition to the powers provided for it expressly in this ADB
Agreement, exercise all the powers delegated to it by the Board of Governors."
It then proceeds to list specific powers of the Board of Directors. With respect to the
President, article 37(2) provides that "[t]he President shall be the chief of staff of the Bank
and shall conduct, under the direction of the Board of Directors, the current business of
49
the Bank."
It is evident from the foregoing that each of the principal decision-making organs, notwithstanding the hierarchy of norms within the institution, is vested with specific powers
in addition to delegated powers, such as in the case of the Board of Directors and the
President. The Board of Directors' powers to conduct the general operations of the Bank
must be exercised without prejudice to the powers of the Board of Governors. This prescription is amplified in article 4(1) of the General Regulations, which states, in pertinent
part, that: "the Board of Directors shall not adopt any measure which is inconsistent with
50
any measure adopted by the Board of Governors." The decision on the choice of the
location of the Headquarters of the Bank is a decision that rests exclusively within the
5
purview of the Board of Governors. " However, at every stage in the process, the 1964
decision on the location of the headquarters of the Bank was never contested. Rather, the
GCC re-affirmed that the Bank's headquarters would remain in the host country. Accordingly, the Board of Directors would not be exercising its powers or acting to the prejudice
of the powers of the Board of Governors. The critical legal issue was, therefore, whether
in the specific context of the provisions of the Bank Agreement the Board of Directors
would exceed its powers.
In the General Counsel's submissions to the GCC, he opined that it would not. Under
article 46 of the ADB Agreement, in an emergency, the Board of Directors may suspend
temporarily operations in respect of new loans and guarantees pending an opportunity for
2
further consideration and action by the Board of Governors. The situation in the host
pursuant to article
Bank's
operations
of
the
suspension
A
an
emergency.
clearly
was
country
46 could have had deleterious effects and caused irreparable damage to the Bank and its
reputation. Also, it could have had potentially adverse financial consequences for the Bank
under contractual clauses concluded in the international capital markets (in connection with
its borrowing operations) and under swap or derivative contracts with counter parties. The
view expressed was that since the Board of Directors, in an emergency, has the specific
power under article 46 to take such a drastic decision, it follows that it can invoke the same
powers to adopt less severe measures, including temporarily transferring the operations of
the Bank to a third state to avoid a suspension of the Bank's activities. Accordingly, the
Board of Directors would be acting within its powers by deciding to temporarily transfer

48. Id. art. 32.
49. In 1997,as part of the internal governance reforms of the Bank, article 4 of the General Regulations of
the Bank was amended to address any conflict arising from possible overlap of the Board of Directors' powers
and those of the President in regard to the general operations of the Bank or the conduct of its business. There
was an attempt to convene an extraordinary meeting, but the minimum requirement was not fulfilled (Rule
1(2)) of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors. Id. art. 37.
50.

COMPENDIUM

OF THE GENERAL LAws AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN

DEVELOPMENT BANK

(2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].

51. ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39(2).
52. Id. art. 46.
FALL 2004
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the operations of the Bank in the specific context of a threat to the security of its staff and
to its institutional capacity to deliver on its development mandate. This was a matter of
interpretation of the Bank's Charter and, therefore, within the purview of the Board of
53
Directors as the primary interpretative organ of the Bank.
On the basis of the GCC's final guidance or recommendation, the Board of Directors
convened in Accra on February 19, 2003, and authorized the temporary relocation of the
Bank's operations to its TRA in Tunis. 4 Given that the extent of the prospective temporary
relocation exceeded the initial estimates projected in the Business Continuity and Emergency Plan and would include a transfer of the Board of Directors, legal advice was sought
on the appropriate legal basis for the transfer of the Board of Directors to the TRA.
The issue was complicated by two considerations. First, the Board of Directors could
not decide to transfer itself since this would be contrary to good corporate governance and
raise concerns about abusive exercise of power and conflict of interest. Second, article 34(1)
of the Bank provides that the Board of Directors shall function in continuous session at the
principal office of the Bank and shall meet as often as the business of the Bank may require.
In 1966, the Board of Governors decided that Executive Directors would reside at the
headquarters, and accordingly, a decision had to be made consistent with the provisions of
the ADB Agreement, to formally transfer Executive Directors from the headquarters to the
TRA. In his advice to the Governors, the General Counsel opined that only the Board of
Governors could make such a decision. Since the decision had to be expedited, it was
decided that the proposal would be submitted to the Board of Governors pursuant to the
provisions of article 31(3) of the ADB Agreement, and article 3 of the Bank's General
Regulations, which establishes a special procedure for seeking the Board of Governors'
decision by postal ballot or correspondence. Article 31(3) of the ADB Agreement provides
the enabling power for the provisions contained in article 3 of the General Regulations. 5
Article 3 provides as follows:
Whenever the Board of Directors considers that the decision on a specific question which is
for the Board of Governors to determine should not be postponed until the next annual meeting of the Board and does not warrant the calling of an ad hoc meeting of that Board, the
Board of Directors shall promptly transmit through the President to each member its proposals
relating to that question with a request for a vote on such proposals by the Governor representing that member.5 6
In summary, the resultant legal framework is that in an emergency as declared by the
competent organ of the Bank in accordance with its Emergency Plan, the Board of Directors, in lieu of exercising its powers under article 46 of the ADB Agreement to temporarily
suspend the Bank's operations may temporarily transfer the operations of the Bank from
its principal office to a designated third country, in this case Tunis, pending an opportunity
for further consideration or action by the Board of Governors. The institution may, in the
event of a crisis, lawfully depart temporarily from its headquarters to preserve its development mandate.

53. Id. art. 61.
54. Resolution B/BD/2003/03-F/BD/2003/02.
55. ADB Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31(3).
56. COMPENDIUM, supra note 50.
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Following the decision of the Board of Directors on February 19, 2003, the remainder
of the staff was asked to proceed on missions or take extended administrative leave to their
home countries. They and their dependants were evacuated by charter flights with Accra,
Ghana and Dakar, Senegal as the regional hubs. Many were evacuated with very short notice
(within forty eight hours) and few personal belongings. Additional staff members were
assigned to the TRA in Tunis, and Board members also proceeded to the TRA on mission,
pending the Board of Governors approval of the resolution authorizing their formal transfer
to the TRA. On arrival in Tunis, it was discovered that although the legal framework for
57
the reception of the Bank and its officials was firmly in place, the infrastructure was not
ready. The office buildings were incomplete, vital records and documents were still in transit
from the headquarters to the TRA, furniture and IT equipment was not delivered, and
officials and Bank's staff had to be put up in hotels until such time that a decision would
be made on when they could move to suitable private accommodations. Also, at that stage,
staff members assigned to Tunis were not permitted to bring along their families and were,
in many respects refugees, as was the Bank itself.
The legal issues that were addressed during this phase were no less complicated than
those addressed previously. First, the Board of Directors had to determine the status and
financial regime that applied to relocated staff, taking into consideration that the GCC
recommended that cost savings be made. The Board of Directors meeting in Tunis (pursuant to specific provisions in their Rules of Procedure, permitting the Board of Directors
to meet elsewhere other than at the Principal Office) decided that staff would be considered
on full mission status for the first month after the temporary relocation decision, but thereafter would be entitled to certain benefits on the basis of a modified financial compensation
regime. This latter regime included the payment of a fixed monthly allowance in lieu of
full mission per diem."8
The GCC had not defined the length of the temporary relocation period, but rather
agreed that the decision of the Board of Directors would be reviewed every six months.
Therefore, the next review would be in August 2003, after the 2003 Annual Meeting in
May. It soon became apparent, however, that the Board of Governors would conduct a preemptive review and take a definitive position on the temporary relocation before the August
date. As in the past, certain Executive Directors wanting to avoid potentially divisive discussions at the 2003 Annual meeting, recommended that a GCC meeting be convened on
the eve of the Annual Meeting to consider a proposal for a definition of the temporary
relocation period and other incidental matters that could be endorsed formally by the Board
of Governors. The Dean of the Board of Governors was designated to informally meet
with the General Counsel to discuss the outlines of the proposal and inquire about its legal
feasibility. Interestingly, the Executive Directors were unanimous in convening a GCC
meeting before the Annual Meeting, although their motivations may have been different.
The General Counsel's informal advice to the Boards, relayed through their Dean, was
that any decision for an extension of the temporary relocation period beyond the initial six
months would be within the purview of the Bank's Board of Governors, and not the Bank's
Board of Directors. There was no legal basis for a different and more favorable construction
57. TRA Agreement, supra note 26.
58. Resolution B/BD/2003/05-F/BD/2003/04 adopted by the Boards of Directors of the Bank and the Fund
on April 2, 2003, concerning the Status and Financial Regime Applicable to Staff During the Period of Temporary Relocation.
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of the emergency powers vested in the Board of Directors by article 46 of the ADB Agreement to temporarily suspend the Bank's operations. This opinion was initially not well
received by the management, although with the passage of time, its logic and legal sense
became evident. In practical terms, such a decision by the Board of Governors would provide the stability required for the Bank to conduct its operations at its temporary location,
as well as avoid any disruption to its staff, thus enabling them to plan and enter into longer
term contractual commitments.
The GCC met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the eve of the 2003 Annual Meeting and
endorsed the policy framework proposed by the Boards of Directors, containing the time
frame for the temporary relocation. The GCC submitted a report to the Board of Governors, and on the basis of the its recommendations, the Board of Governors, while affirming that the headquarters of the Bank would remain in the host country, decided that:
(1) The temporary relocation of the operations of the Bank to the TRA in Tunis would
be for a minimum period of two years;
(2) There would be six monthly assessments by the Boards of Directors of the security
situation in the host country;
(3) The Board of Governors would conduct annual substantive reviews at each Annual
meeting; and
(4) In order to avoid any precipitate return that could be disruptive of the Bank's operations and activities, if a decision is taken to return to the headquarters, the return
would be implemented over a one-year period s9
In effect, management could plan an orderly return to the headquarters, and thereby
avoid repeating some of the adverse experiences associated with the relocation. Also, the
earliest the Bank could return to its headquarters would be the third quarter of 2005,
assuming a favorable decision to terminate the temporary relocation was made by the Board
of Governors at the 2004 Annual Meeting.
After the authoritative decision of the Board of Governors on the timeframe for the
temporary relocation, it became necessary to revisit the status of the staff and to design an
appropriate framework for those affected. By this time, the full complement of the Bank's
staff was in Tunis, and the Bank had resumed its lending operations. On July 18, 2003, the
Board of Directors considered and endorsed a management proposal on the legal and policy
framework governing the status of the staff in the context of the Temporary Relocation
Extended Mission Regime. 60 The Board discussed the framework within the context of the
general legal principle of the separation of powers as between the Board and the President
contained in article 4 of the General Regulations of the Bank, as well as the consultative
provisions contained in Staff Regulation 2.1.3 adopted by the Board of Directors on March
20, 1998. Staff Regulation 2.1.3 requires that the President of the Bank should consult with

59. Resolution B/BG/2003/04 adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bank on June 3, 2003, fixing the
timeframe of the temporary relocation of the operations of the Bank (the Initial Temporary Relocation Period)
to the TRA.
60. Only the Board of Directors of the Bank discussed the Framework, because the ADF has no staff as
such. In accordance with article 31 of the ADF Agreement, the Fund uses the officers, staff, organization,
services and facilities of the Bank, and reimburses the Bank for the fair value of such use. ADB Agreement,
supra note 2, art. 31.
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the Board of Directors when making amendments to the Staff Rules, promulgated by the
President pursuant to powers vested in him under Staff Regulation 2.1.3.
Since the Board of Governors decided that the headquarters would remain in Abidjan,
and the definition of the staff members' "duty station" would remain the same, the legal
and policy framework would have to be consistent with this decision. The General Counsel
was requested to prepare a legal note summarizing his interventions during the Board of
Directors' meeting on three issues: (1) the applicability or otherwise of the concept of "Duty
Station" in the context of the Framework; (2) the competent authority within the Bank for
approving modifications of the type contained in the Framework, (e.g., whether the proposed modifications should be approved by the Board of Directors or Management); and
(3) whether the proposed modifications are consistent with the provisions on amendments
contained in the Staff Regulations and the Staff Rules respectively. The legal note was
submitted to the Board of Directors on September 9, 2003.61 The Opinion confirmed that:
(1) the proposals contained in the Framework Paper were consistent with the decision of
the Board of Governors that the headquarters should remain in the host country; (2) the
rule-making authority for deciding on modifications to the provisions of the Staff Rules to
give effect to the new Framework belongs to the President, in the exercise of his independent powers as the chief of staff of the Bank, with specific authority to assign and re-assign
complied
staff; and (3) although the proposals did not amend the existing Staff Rules, they
62
with safeguards that would otherwise have applied in the case of amendments.
V. The Experience of Other International Financial
Institutions
The temporary relocation of the operations of the Bank is unique in terms of the scale
and scope of the relocation. Other international organizations faced with similar crises
within their headquarters' host country have taken similar evasive measures to safeguard
their operations. In May 1940, during the Second World War, when the fighting between
the German and French armies was eminent, the Principle Office of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) moved out of Basel into the mountains. The move lasted until
October 1940.63 Similarly, in 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi army, the
Kuwaiti Fund for International Development temporarily relocated its operations from
Kuwait City for a duration of six months.
Two African regional organizations have also relocated because of crises in their host
countries. In 1994, the PTA Bank relocated to Nairobi, Kenya from Bujumbura, Burundi.
Although the Heads of State of the PTA member countries decided that the institution
should return to Bujumbura, PTA Bank still operates out of Nairobi, because of the continued instability and insecurity in Bujumbura. The second regional organization is the
African Regional Office of the World Health Organization (AFRO). Prior to the outbreak
of civil hostilities in the Republic of Congo, AFRO was located in Brazzaville. However, in

61. Document ADB/BD/V7P/2003/77/Add.l.
62. Adesegun A. Akin-Olugbade, Legal Note, On the Status of Staff in the Context of the Temporary Relocation
ErtendedMissionRegime, Sept. 1, 2003 (on file with author).
63. Roger Auboin, Memorandum sur les circonstances qui ont conduit au transfert de laBanque des Reglements
Internationauxa Chateau d'Oex (Memorandun on the circumstances that led to the transfer of the Bank of
International Settlements to the Chateau d'Oex) (on file with author).
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June 1997, internationally recruited staff members were evacuated and the office was provisionally closed. AFRO was temporarily relocated to Harare, Zimbabwe on September 1,
1997. On July 17, 1998, the temporary relocation of the AFRO to Harare was extended
for two years effective from February 1, 1998. As was ultimately decided in the case of the
Bank staff, relocated, AFRO staff members were maintained on travel status and not deemed
to have changed their "duty station."
VI. Epilogue: Lessons to be Learned from the Temporary
Relocation
We live in a world where we cannot make life entirely safe for civic communities, private
firms, or international organizations. The recent experience of the Bank has important
lessons from a legal as well as operational standpoint. International organizations, as subjects
of public international law, sometimes find themselves operating under conditions that call
for jurisprudential astuteness. While they must act within frameworks that respect established statutes, internal regulations and external obligations, such precepts have to be interpreted in such a manner as would ensure that their standing in capital markets is not
compromised, and that they are able to continue operations in fulfilment of their developmental mandates and stakeholders' expectations. In such situations, prudence requires
that the demands of judicial propriety be reconciled with the imperatives of good corporate
governance. The successful relocation of the Bank to its TRA in Tunis could be regarded
in this respect as a test case of successful business continuity in a time of crisis-a triumph
of legal creativity over adverse circumstances. This success is a result, in large part, of
boldness in devising an effective legal framework that ensured expeditious transfer of operations without any major encumbrances. In the emerging world of the 21st century, with its
tumults and upheavals, it may indeed contain an important lesson for global governance

and international order.
The Bank was able to resume its operations within three months after the unprecedented
move involving over a thousand personnel and several tons of vital documents. Not only
did management have to overcome challenging logistical hurdles, due care had to be taken
to ensure a smooth landing for the Bank and its personnel in a new cultural environment.
It is indeed remarkable that in 2003, notwithstanding the temporary relocation, the Bank
was able to exceed the lending programs for the previous years and recorded gross operating
income comparable to the record operating income declared for the previous year. Standard
& Poor's, the only rating agency that rated the Bank's senior debt below the highest rating
of AAA, since 1995, restored the Bank's AAA rating in June 2003. The Bank also successfully
launched its first US$1 billion global bond in 2003.
The temporary relocation was, however, not a hitch-free exercise. It was indeed a rather
expensive undertaking, involving considerable extra-budgetary expenditures. 64 Many risks
were underestimated. One of the major risks was the decision to change the assumptions
that informed the Business Continuity Plan. The Business Continuity Plan had been designed to provide facilities for a staff of 400 in Tunis. In the end, however, almost the
entirety of the Bank's staff was forced to move to Tunis, which necessitated the identification
and leasing of additional buildings, and acquisition of essential equipment and its installa-

64. Final estimates are that the relocation cost at least US$50 million.
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tion. Certain functions were either over or under represented since when formulating the
Business Continuity Plan, many supervisors did not appreciate the importance of such
functions during a crisis. Communication with staff on mission and on administrative leave
was inadequate and in some cases non-existent, causing a lot of staff anxiety. The staff's
traumatic experience, abandoning their families and homes with very short notice had to
be managed, and in the case of staff members who were nationals of the host country (such
as the general services staff), there was also the additional burden of managing the inevitable
trauma of being asked to leave one's country. The initial emphasis of the relocation and
apparent priority of management appeared to have been maintaining the business continuity
of the Bank, and not staff welfare. In summary, the temporary relocation was a costly
exercise, both in human and financial terms.
VII. Conclusion
The temporary relocation of the Bank in 2003 was unprecedented in terms of the scale
and scope of the relocation, and also on account of the complexity of the legal issues addressed both prior to and after the relocation. The guiding principle in the design of the
legal frameworks for the temporary relocation was ensuring the survival of the institution
as an international organization and preserving its developmental mandate. The temporary
relocation was ultimately successful because the principal decision-making organs recognized the importance of the rule of law and strictly adhered to the fundamental legal principle of separation of powers.Also, the commitment and personal sacrifice of the staff of
the institution played a critical role. The Bank today remains the leading development
finance institution on the continent of Africa because of its capacity for survival in the face
of quite daunting challenges.
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